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Abstract: This paper formally introduces channel decomposition, a method that systematically 
decomposes the channels through which the determinants of growth operate, into the analysis of 
economic growth.  Under channel decomposition, the determinants could affect economic growth through 
physical capital accumulation, through human capital acquisition, and/or through growth in total factor 
productivity.  Thus, by examining the outcomes of the decomposition, we can test alternative models, as 
different models often imply different channels of operation for the determinants.  Methodologically, 
channel decomposition combines growth accounting with regression analysis, rather than regarding them 
as alternative approaches.  With this method, it becomes clear that technological catch-up, not factor 
accumulation, accounts for the widely documented phenomenon of conditional convergence.  This 
finding turns out to be extremely robust.  In effect, this finding puts the final nails in the coffin of the 
Neoclassical growth model, as the model can neither explain cross-country growth, nor can it explain 
conditional convergence.  The method also shows that both rich and poor countries converge mainly 
through technological catch-up, although richer countries converge much faster than the poor. 
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This paper formally introduces the methodology of channel decomposition or channel account-
ing into the analysis of economic growth. This method systematically decomposes the channels
through which the determinants of growth operate; the determinants, such as initial human capital
and maintenance of the rule of law, can aﬀect growth through three channels: physical capital accu-
mulation, human capital acquisition, or growth in total factor productivity. For example, a better
educated labor force can lead to advances in income per capita either by attracting investment in
plants and factories, by encouraging further education, or by facilitating innovations and the diﬀu-
sion of technology. Channel decomposition systematically determines the empirical importance of
each of these potential channels.
Understanding the channels of growth is important for two reasons. First, a theoretical model
may predict the correct reduced form relationship among aggregate variables, yet postulate the
wrong mechanisms underlying this relationship. Such models are spurious, and can only be weeded
out by studying the actual mechanisms. Second, since models can be observationally indistinguish-
able in the reduced form relationships they predict, but diﬀerentiable by the mechanisms they
postulate, they are empiricially distinguishable by examining the actual channels of operation. Al-
though there were several precursors to the idea of channel decomposition, they have failed to fully
exploit this method as a systematic tool of analysis.1 My study remedies this gap in the literature.
Methodologically, channel decomposition combines a growth accounting exercise with a cross-
country regression – the two traditional approaches to the study of economic growth – by applying
them sequentially. The growth accounting exercise decomposes observed economic growth into
contributions due to factor accumulation and ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP).2 On the other
1See, for example, Jeﬀrey A. Frankel and David Romer (1999) and Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones (1999).
2TFP, also known as ‘Solow residual,’ is often thought to reﬂect technological progress and other elements.
2hand, cross-country regression attributes the same observed economic growth to the impact of
determinants, such as government policies, the institutional environment, household preferences,
natural resources, and initial conditions. Since both approaches attempt to explain the same object,
the determinants must aﬀect economic growth either through factor accumulation or through TFP
growth. In practice, channel decomposition consists of two steps: ﬁrst, decompose economic growth
into components due to factor accumulation and TFP growth; next, regress these components on
the determinants of growth. Hence, rather than regarding growth accounting and growth regression
as alternative approaches to the study of economic growth, this paper stresses that they can be
usefully combined to analyze the channels of growth.
Combining Peter J. Klenow and Andres Rodriguez-Clare’s (1997) growth accounting method-
ology with Robert J. Barro’s (1997) determinants of growth, channel decomposition reveals that
technological catch-up, not factor accumulation, accounts primarily for the widely documented phe-
nomenon of conditional convergence. Furthermore, although richer countries converge much faster
than poorer ones, both rich and poor countries converge through the same channel, i.e., through
TFP catch-up. The convergence channel through TFP growth is extremely robust to omitted vari-
ables, although the result is weaker if the alternative accounting methodology of Hall and Jones
(1999) is used instead; in which case, TFP growth continues to drive convergence among the OECD
countries, but physical capital accumulation is equally important in bringing about convergence
among a larger cross-section of countries.
However, insofar as we care about convergence where its eﬀect is the strongest, these ﬁnd-
ings essentially put the ﬁnal nail in the coﬃn of the Neo-Classical growth model, as the model
emphasizes the role of capital accumulation in economic growth. To elaborate, although the Neo-
Classical growth model was rejected as an adequate explanation of cross-country growth when
the growth accounting literature found a large TFP component in output per capita, it was later
3salvaged when cross-country regressions found signiﬁcant conditional convergence, as economists
thought convergence was due to diminishing returns to capital accumulation. However, since chan-
nel decomposition shows that, for the most part, growth in total factor productivity is what drives
conditional convergence, the Neo-Classical growth model loses its appeal.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the growth regression
and accounting approaches, followed by a synthesis that leads to channel decomposition. It then
reviews the related literature and explains how the existing literature falls short of full-ﬂedged
channel decomposition. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results from
channel decomposition and the robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Methodology: A Two-Stage Channel Decomposition Ap-
proach
The empirical framework for growth regressions is based on the notion of conditional convergence
developed by Robert J. Barro (1991) and N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David N. Weil
(1992). Under that framework, income per capita in a given country converges to that country’s
steady-state. Since diﬀerent countries may have diﬀerent steady states, convergence is observed
only after controlling for the determinants of the steady state, such as diﬀerences in government
policies, political stability, and household preferences. In other words, observed income growth is
a function of initial income and the determinants of steady state:
g(Y/L)=α + γlnyi,t + θ Xi,t +  i,t,i=1 ,...,n, (1)
where g(.) denotes growth rate, Y income, L labor, yi,t income per capita for country i at time
t, Xi,t a column vector of variables that control for the determinants of steady-state income per
capita, and  i,t is the disturbance term. Finally, β  =( α,γ,θ ) is a row vector of parameters of
4conforming dimensions. An estimated value of γ<0 would imply conditional convergence in output
per worker.
Under the growth accounting framework, observed economic growth can also be expressed as
the sum of the contributions associated with factor accumulation and a residual, often referred to
as the ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP). For example, given the production function in Mankiw,




1 − α − β
g(K/Y )+
β
1 − α − β
g(H/Y )+g(A), (2)
where Y is output, A is the productivity index, K is the physical capital stock, H is the human
capital stock, L is labor, and g(.) denotes the growth rate.3 More generally, letting GOUTPUT,
GCAPITAL, GHUMAN,a n dGA denote the growth rate of output per worker, the contribution
to growth from physical capital accumulation, the contribution to growth from human capital
accumulation, and TFP growth respectively, equation (2) can be rewritten as
GOUTPUT ≡ GCAPITAL + GHUMAN + GA. (3)
Equations (1) and (3) explain the same object, i.e., observed economic growth g(Y/L). Combin-
ing the right hand side of the two equations, one immediately sees that the determinants – initial
income and other determinants of steady state (lnyi,t and Xi,t) – must aﬀect the growth of output
per worker (GOUTPUT) through three channels: physical capital accumulation, human capital
acquistion, and/or TFP growth (GCAPITAL, GHUMAN and GA). Substituting the growth
3There are two points worth noting about this decomposition methodology, as pointed out by Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997). First, the decomposition is performed on output per capita rather than total output since
diﬀerences in output per capita are the object of interest. Second, by decomposing the growth of output per capita
into TFP growth and the growth of factor intensities such as K/Y and H/Y, the decomposition gives A “credit”
for variations in K and H generated by diﬀerences in A. The variations in factor intensity X capture only those
variations in K and H not induced by A. In addition, along a balanced growth path, the factor intensities are
proportional to the investment rate, so that this form of the decomposition has a natural interpretation. Similar
principles are adhered to in Hall and Jones (1999).
5accounting identity (3) into the formula of a linear estimator of β, it follows that
βGOUTPUT ≡ βGCAPITAL + βGHUMAN + βGA, (4)
where βGOUTPUT, for example, denotes the coeﬃcients obtained from regressing GCAPITAL on the
determinants.4 The above identity deﬁnes “channel decomposition.” It is an identity because it is
based on the growth accounting identity. By decomposing the coeﬃcient estimates, I have in eﬀect
decomposed the channels of growth because the identity tells us that the eﬀect of any determinant
on the growth rate of output per worker (βGOUTPUT) can be decomposed into the eﬀect through
the TFP growth (βGA) and the eﬀect through factor contributions (βGCAPITAL and βGHUMAN).
Hence, the relative importance of each channel can be measured by the relative magnitude of βGA,
βGCAPITAL and βGHUMAN with respect to βGOUTPUT.5
As an example, most cross-country studies ﬁnd conditional convergence in output per worker
at the rate of about 2.5 percent per year. The question is how much of this convergence is achieved
through technological catch-up, and how much of it is due to aggregate factor accumulation. It
turns out that this question can be easily answered by channel decomposition, by comparing the
relative magnitude of γGA to γGCAPITAL and γGHUMAN,w h e r eγ is the coeﬃcient estimate on
lnyi,t. For instance, a negative γGA implies that TFP growth leads to convergence, while a positive
γGA implies divergence. Thus, if γGA is negative and large in magnitude compared to γGCAPITAL
and γGHUMAN, then conditional convergence in output per worker is attributable to technological
4For example, consider the simplest linear estimator – the OLS estimator. To simplify the exposition, the intercept
term and the initial income term in equation (1) can be suppressed under Xi,t without loss of generality. The OLS
estimator of βGOUTPUT =( X
 X)
−1X
 (GOUTPUT). Substitute the expression for GOUTPUT from equation (3)















= βGCAPITAL + βGHUMAN + βGA.
5Note that the channel accounting identity is valid if and only if the same set of regressors and the same linear
estimator are used in all regressions.
6improvement rather than factor accumulation, and vice versa.
To perform channel decomposition in practice, I simply apply growth accounting and cross-
country regression sequentially. First, I choose a growth accounting methodology to decompose the
growth rate of output per worker. Then, I successively regress each component from the growth
accounting exercise on the determinants. The coeﬃcient estimates obtained from each regression
together constitute channel decomposition, as they satisfy the channel accounting identity (4).
2.1 Related Literature
The idea that diﬀerent determinants may aﬀect economic growth through diﬀerent channels is not
new. In fact, this idea is arguably implicit in every growth accounting exercise.6 However, empirical
implementation of this idea is surprisingly scarce. I am only aware of four related papers. Barry
P. Bosworth, Susan M. Collins, and Yu-Chin Chen (1995) and Jess Benhabib and Mark M. Spiegel
(2000) contain ideas similar to channel decomposition, but their methods fail to amount to channel
decomposition, as their estimates do not satisfy the channel accounting identity (4). Bosworth,
Collins, and Chen (1995) study the eﬀect of macroeconomic stability on aggregate factor growth
and TFP growth.7 Benhabib and Spiegel (2000), on the other hand, examine whether ﬁnancial
development aﬀects growth through its contribution to the rates of factor investments or total
factor productivity.8 Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) diﬀer from the other papers in how factor shares
are treated; they are estimated along with other parameters in the model, instead of assumed ﬁxed.
Frankel and Romer (1999) and Hall and Jones (1999) do recognize the channel decomposition
6See, for example, Robert J. Barro (1998).
7Their main regression results are that orthodox macroeconomic policy, combined with outward oriented trade
policies foster economic growth. In particular, they show that larger budget deﬁcits slow growth through reducing
capital accumulation, while real exchange rate volatility operates mainly through slower TFP growth. However,
outward orientation appears to work through both channels.
8They ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial development indicators that are correlated with total factor productivity growth
diﬀer from those that encourage investment. However, many of their results are sensitive to the inclusion of country
ﬁxed eﬀects.
7interpretation; their estimates satisfy the channel accounting identity (4). However, in applying
the method, both papers focus on only one of many determinants: trade share in the former and
social infrastructure in the latter. Because of their focus, they fail to fully explore the method as a
systematic approach of decomposing the channels of growth.9 In addition, since both papers apply
the method to level accounting rather than growth accounting, their results may be plagued by the
inﬂuence of country-speciﬁc factors that remain constant over time.10
3T h e D a t a
Given any growth accounting methodology and any linear regression estimator, the channel account-
ing identity will give a parallel decomposition in the channels of growth. In the following sections, I
am going to illustrate this approach by applying a version of Barro’s (1997) cross-country regression
on the growth decomposition by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).11 This amounts to asking the
question: To what extent are the estimated eﬀects of the determinants highlighted in Barro (1997)
due to their impacts on technological progress, physical capital accumulation, and human capital
accumulation respectively? For example, Barro (1997) ﬁnds a conditional rate of convergence of 2.5
percent per year. The question is how much of this convergence is achieved through technological
catch-up, and how much of it is due to faster physical and human capital accumulation.
The determinants in Barro (1997) include the most common set of determinants used in cross-
country regressions. Data for these determinants have been collected from various sources.12 They
9To be fair, one reason why both papers focus on only one determinant is certainly because they use instrumental
variable regression. To the extent that they have valid instruments, they can consider the eﬀect of the instrumented
variable independently of other explanatory variables. However, the fact remains that they never use channel decom-
position beyond showing that the particular determinant that they consider is important in the sense that it aﬀects
income through all channels. As a consequence, they fail to exploit the method as a systematic tool to decompose
the channels of growth, and to use it to distinguish alternative models.
10Hall and Jones (1999) do control for the size of the mining sector, which is one component of the country-speciﬁc
factors.
11The regressions here are cross-sectional, whereas Barro (1997) takes a panel regression approach.
12See the appendix for the sources.
8correspond closely to the ones used in Barro (1997), except for the measure of initial human capital.
To measure initial human capital, I use the average years of schooling in the total population aged
15 and over.13
The growth decomposition in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) covers 98 countries over the
period 1960–1985, the most popular period for empirical growth regressions. Their decomposition
is one of the most sophisticated and careful large-scale growth accounting exercises available. They
assume a production function for human capital, which is more labor intensive than the production
of goods. They calculate the stock of human capital using enrollment rates in primary, secondary,
and tertiary levels, assuming a constant return to education of 9.5 percent and incorporating
human capital acquired through experience. They also adjust human capital for the failure of
national income accounting to include the value of student time. The decomposition takes the form
of equation (2).
3.1 The Samples
I consider two samples of countries. The ﬁrst sample consists of the 23 OECD countries.14 The
quality of the data tends to be better for this sample. However, due to its small sample size,
the model ﬁtted has to be parsimonious. Since income convergence among the OECD countries
is one of the most well documented phenomena in the literature, for this sample, I focus on the
channels of convergence, i.e., whether income convergence is achieved through TFP growth or factor
accumulation.
13Instead, Barro (1997) uses the average years of schooling for the male population aged 25 and over. While his
measure of initial human capital ﬁts his data best, a priori, it does not seem to accurately measure human capital
for three reasons. First, it ignores female educational attainment, which tends to overestimate human capital in
developing countries where educational opportunity is more uneven. Second, it includes only human capital embodied
in persons aged 25 and over, which tends to underestimate the stock of human capital in developing countries where
people tend to leave schools at a younger age. Third, it ignores primary education, which tends to underestimate
human capital in developing countries. Because of the above reasons, I use a diﬀerent measure of human capital.
14Luxembourg is excluded because it has no data on educational attainment in the Barro-Lee data set.
9The second sample includes 77 countries. It is used to estimate the baseline model, which
includes all but three of the determinants found in Barro (1997). The three determinants excluded
are the change in terms of trade, initial life expectancy at birth, and average inﬂation rate. The
change in terms of trade and average inﬂation are excluded because they are better thought of
as symptoms of some deeper problems in the economy rather than as fundamental determinants
of growth. Initial life expectancy at birth is excluded because another proxy for initial human
capital – the average years of schooling – has already been included.15 Thus, including initial life
expectancy is likely to induce multicollinearity without adding any information. In any case, I will
show that the channels for these three variables are indeed jointly statistically insigniﬁcant if they
are included.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Regression Results Using the OECD Sample
Convergence among OECD countries is one of the most well documented phenomena in the empir-
ical growth literature. However, the channels through which this convergence is achieved remain
largely unresolved. To analyze the channels of convergence, the log of initial real income per capita
and its interaction with initial human capital are included. The interaction term is included because
the speed of convergence may depend on the initial absorptive capacity of the economy. Table 1
reports the results from channel decomposition based on the OLS estimator, where convergence is
conditional on initial human capital and the total fertility rate over 1960–1984.16 The regression
15Initial life expectancy is often included to reﬂect better health of the population.
16Heteroskedasticity is a potential problem. The usual OLS estimator, while still consistent, becomes ineﬃcient and
the standard errors are biased when heteroskedasticity is not taken into consideration. To correct for heteroskedas-
ticity, the bias-adjusted heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used instead. Russell Davidson and James
G. MacKinnon (1993) refer to the estimator I use as the HC2 estimator. It is essentially an improved White
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. Note that an alternative remedy to heteroskedasticity is to use Weighted
Least Squares (WLS). WLS is eﬃcient under heteroskedasticity. However, the use of WLS requires some assumptions
about the form of heteroskedasticity. For example, Barro (1991) weights the observations in accordance to the levels
10estimates clearly satisfy the channel decomposition identity (4); the coeﬃcient estimates in the
GOUTPUT regression in Table 1 are indeed the sum of the corresponding estimates in the GA,
GCAPITAL,a n dGHUMAN regressions.
The results in Table 1 imply conditional convergence at an annual rate of 2.58 percent for
output per worker, 2.39 percent for TFP, and 0.57 percent for the contribution from physical capital
accumulation. On the other hand, the contribution from human capital accumulation diverges at
the rate of 0.37 percent per year.17 These results imply that faster TFP growth alone accounts for
more than 90 percent of the conditional convergence in output per worker.18 In contrast, aggregate
capital accumulation, i.e., physical and human capital accumulation taken together, contributes
little to convergence. Furthermore, these channels of convergence are all statistically signiﬁcant at
the ﬁve percent level, except the channel through physical capital accumulation.19 In short, TFP
growth, not factor accumulation, is what drives income convergence among OECD countries.
4.2 Regression Results Using the Sample of 77 (Baseline Model)
The baseline model includes all but three determinants from Barro (1997). The three variables
omitted are the change in terms of trade, initial life expectancy at birth and average inﬂation rate.
As argued earlier, these variables have weak theoretical support for inclusion in the ﬁrst place.
The F-statistics testing their joint signiﬁcance conﬁrm that they are highly insigniﬁcant in all four
of per capita GDP. However, Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik (1999) argue that the errors for poor countries’
growth data implied by such a weighting assumption seem to be unreasonably high. Moreover, heteroskedasticity may
be a problem in some regressions but not for the others. In that case, only those that suﬀer from heteroskedasticity
need to be adjusted. However, if diﬀerent weights are used in diﬀerent regressions, the channel decomposition identity
of the two-stage approach will no longer hold. For these reasons, OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors, instead of WLS, are used.
17Two variables — initial income and its interaction with initial human capital — are used to capture the conver-
gence eﬀect here. The rates of conditional convergence are evaluated at the average years of schooling among the 23
OECD countries in the year 1960, i.e., 6.53 years. For example, the rate of conditional convergence for the growth
of output per worker is calculated as [0.29+(0.35)(6.53)] = 2.58 percent. I ﬁnd very similar rates of convergence if I
include only one of the two variables in the regression.
18This is because simple calculation gives 2.39/2.58 × 100% = 92.6 percent.
19In other words, the coeﬃcients on initial income and its interaction with initial human capital are jointly statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level in all regressions in Table 1, except the GCAPITAL regression.
11regressions.20 Table 2 reports the results from channel decomposition for the baseline model, using
the OLS estimator. As the channel decomposition identity (4) dictates, the coeﬃcient estimates in
the GA, GCAPITAL,a n dGHUMAN regressions in Table 2 indeed add up to the corresponding
estimates in the GOUTPUT regression.
All the coeﬃcients in the GOUTPUT regression have the right signs. However, the coeﬃcients
on the East Asian dummy, total fertility rate, democracy index and its square are not statistically
signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. The R-squared levels are 0.61, 0.43, and 0.26 in the GA,
GCAPITAL,a n dGHUMAN regressions respectively. This means that more of the variation in
TFP growth is explained by these determinants than the variations in physical and human capital
contributions. The speciﬁc ﬁndings from channel decomposition are discussed below.
4.3 Empirical Findings on Channel Decomposition
4.3.1 Initial Income per Capita and the Interaction Term (Convergence)
Evaluated at the average level of initial human capital, which is 3.69 years for the full sample for
which data is available, the coeﬃcients imply an average rate of conditional convergence of 1.75
percent per year in output per worker, which is close to the estimates of 2 percent found by most
studies. Of the 1.75 percentage points, 1.92 percentage points work through TFP growth (con-
vergence), -0.11 percentage points through physical capital accumulation (divergence), and -0.06
20When I include these three variables for hypothesis testing, only 58 country-observations remain with complete
data. I further omit three observations that are inﬂuential: Bolivia (BOL) is inﬂuential in the relationships between
the components of growth and average inﬂation, while Israel (ISR) and Bangladesh (BGD) are inﬂuential with
respect to the terms of trade shocks. Including these three variables does not yield any additional insights. Most
of the coeﬃcients have the expected signs, but are not statistically signiﬁcant. Evaluated at the average level
of initial human capital, which is 3.69 years for the full sample of 106 countries, the estimates imply an average
rate of convergence of 2.45 percent in output per worker, which is very close to the 2.5 percent estimate found in
Barro (1997). Channel decomposition reveals that of the 2.45 percentage points, 2.30percentage points comes from
technological catch-up (convergence), 0.24 percentage points from physical capital accumulation (convergence), and
-0.09 percentage points from human capital accumulation (divergence). These estimates imply that TFP growth alone
accounts for about 94 percent (=2.3/2.45 × 100%) of the conditional convergence in output per worker. Furthermore,
the TFP channel is the only channel of convergence that is statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, TFP growth is still what
drives income convergence.
12percentage points through human capital accumulation (divergence). These channels are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the ten percent level, except the channel through human capital acquisition.21
These estimates indicate that technological catch-up, not factor accumulation, is the principal
channel through which conditional convergence in income per worker is achieved. In fact, factor
accumulation may actually lead to slight divergence.22
4.3.2 Initial Human Capital
A higher level of initial human capital would have two oﬀsetting eﬀects, as reﬂected by the positive
coeﬃcient on initial human capital and the negative coeﬃcient on its interaction with initial income.
For example, consider the regression for output per worker: A higher level of initial human capital
in the form of an additional year of average schooling would have two opposing eﬀects; the direct
eﬀect would increase the growth rate of output per worker by 1.54 percentage points, while the
indirect eﬀect – due to the stronger tendency to converge – would reduce the growth rate of output
per worker by 0.18(7.32) = 1.33 percentage points.23 The net eﬀect would have been an increase
in the growth rate of output per worker of 0.21 percentage points.
Similarly, for each of the growth components, a higher level of initial schooling would also have
two oﬀsetting eﬀects. Again evaluated at the average initial income per capita, the net eﬀect of
an additional year of average schooling in 1960 would be to raise the growth rate of TFP by 0.18
percentage points, the contribution from physical capital accumulation by 0.02 percentage points,
21In other words, the F statistics – that tests the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients on initial income per capita
and its interaction with initial human capital – are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level for all of the
regressions in Table 2 except the regression with GHUMAN as the dependent variable.
22The above estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of the interaction term between initial income per capita
and initial human capital. Had the interaction term been excluded, the coeﬃcient estimate on the logarithm of initial
income per capita would have implied conditional convergence at the rate of 1.71 percent per year in output per worker.
Of the 1.71 percentage points, 1.91 percentage points would have worked through TFP growth (convergence), -0.14
percentage points through physical capital accumulation (divergence), and -0.07 percentage points through human
capital accumulation (divergence).
23This is evaluated at the average initial income per capita of the sample for which data is available. At the average,
ln (initial GDP per capita) = 7.32.
13and the contribution from human capital accumulation by 0.02 percentage points respectively.24
Clearly, for the average country, faster technological catch-up is the principal channel through which
initial human capital aﬀects growth.
The negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term with initial income implies that poorer countries
would beneﬁt more from a higher level of initial human capital. To illustrate, suppose the poorest
country in 1960 were endowed with an additional year of schooling: the growth rate of output per
worker would have increased by (1.54-(0.18)(5.55)=) 0.53 percentage points, of which 0.25 percent-
age points would be attributable to faster technological catch-up, while 0.24 percentage points and
0.04 percentage points would be by way of higher contribution from physical and human capital
accumulation respectively.25 Furthermore, note that the physical-capital-accumulation channel is
more important for the poorer countries. In other words, for the poor countries, a more educated
population stimulates growth by promoting both technological progress and physical capital accu-
mulation. However, as countries develop and become wealthier, the marginal beneﬁt from having
a more educated population comes primarily through faster technological progress.
4.3.3 Total Fertility Rate
As expected, a high fertility rate is harmful for growth. However, none of the coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional levels. Roughly two thirds of the negative eﬀect works
through slower technological catch-up while the rest is mainly through slower physical capital
accumulation. Higher population growth hurts physical capital accumulation because part of the
investment has to be used to provide capital for the new workers, rather than to increase capital
24Had the interaction term been excluded, the coeﬃcient estimate on initial human capital would imply that an
additional year of average schooling at the beginning of the period would have raised the growth rates of output
per worker and TFP by 0.05 and 0.15 percentage points respectively. On the other hand, it would have reduced the
contribution from physical capital and human capital by 0.09 and 0.01 percentage points respectively, which are both
economically small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
25The poorest country in 1960has log of initial income per capita equal to 5.55.
14intensity. The coeﬃcients imply that a one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the
total fertility rate would reduce the growth rate of output per worker by 0.38 percentage points,
the growth rate of TFP by 0.26 percentage points, and the contribution from physical capital
accumulation by 0.12 percentage points. It would have no eﬀect on the contribution from human
capital accumulation.
4.3.4 Government Consumption to GDP Ratio
My measure of government consumption excludes spending on education and national defense
because it is intended to approximate that part of government spending that is nonproductive. As
expected, a higher government consumption ratio hurts all components of growth, with nearly 75
percent of the total eﬀect operating through slower technological progress, the only channel that
is statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient estimate on government consumption ratio in Table 2
implies that a one standard deviation increase in government consumption ratio would reduce the
growth rate of output per worker by 0.62 percentage points. Similarly, it would reduce TFP growth
by 0.46 percentage points, the contribution from physical capital and human capital accumulation
by 0.08 and 0.08 percentage points respectively.
4.3.5 Rule of Law
The rule of law variable is a subjective index which was originally measured in seven categories on
a scale from zero to six. It has been re-scaled to lie between zero and one, with zero indicating
the worst, and one the best. The idea that property rights protection, contract enforcement, and
the maintenance of law and order are important to economic growth is deeply rooted in economic
thinking. This variable is intended to proxy all the above institutions.
The expected eﬀect is conﬁrmed by the positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the
15regressions for both output per worker and TFP. Speciﬁcally, a one-rank improvement in the un-
derlying index, corresponding to a rise of 0.167 in the rule of law variable, would increase the
growth rates of output per worker and TFP by 0.32 and 0.39 percentage points respectively. More
concretely, if Mexico were to perform as well as the United States in the maintenance of rule of law
(corresponding to a two-rank improvement in the underlying index), then my results imply that its
growth rates of output per worker and TFP could have been higher by 0.63 and 0.77 percentage
points respectively. Quite surprisingly, the channel through physical capital accumulation is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
4.3.6 Democracy
The coeﬃcients on the democracy index and its square imply that if a country were to become more
democratic, it would ﬁrst grow faster in output per worker, due to faster growth in TFP and human
capital accumulation. However, beyond certain level of democracy, growth rates would fall with
further improvement in democracy. The opposite pattern holds for physical capital accumulation.
However, these relationships could be spurious, as the scatter plots in Figure 1 in the appendix
reveal: the most undemocratic countries with the least physical capital accumulation have been
omitted from the baseline regression because of missing values in the other determinants in the
regression. What this means is that these missing observations could have distorted the above
relationships.26 Because of this robustness problem, little emphasis is placed on their signiﬁcance.27
26Fortunately, the other determinants in the baseline regression do not suﬀer from the same spuriousness problem,
as the observations omitted – due to missing values in the other determinants in the baseline regression – do not
appear to be inﬂuential.
27It is important to highlight this problem because Barro (1997) ﬁnds an inverted U-shaped (concave) relation
between aggregate economic growth and democracy, i.e., “...growth is increasing in democracy at low levels of democ-
racy, but the relation turns negative once a moderate amount of political freedom has been attained” (Barro, 1997
p. 58). One interpretation of this result is that “...in the worst dictatorships, an increase in political rights tends to
increase growth and investment because the beneﬁt from limitations on governmental power is the key matter. But
in places that have already achieved a moderated amount of democracy, a further increase in political rights impairs
growth and investment because the dominant eﬀect comes from the intensiﬁed concern with income redistribution”
(Barro, 1997 p. 59). However, income redistribution is often thought to harm growth through distortionary capital
taxation (see Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (1994) and Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik (1994)). So if Barro’s
164.3.7 Regional Dummies
The coeﬃcient on the dummy for sub-Saharan Africa is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the
regressions for aggregate and TFP growth. On the contrary, the channels through factor accumu-
lation are negligible and not statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional level. This suggests that
the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are less developed than the other countries, not because they
have less factor accumulation, but because they have much lower TFP growth not accounted for by
diﬀerences in the above determinants. Similarly, the coeﬃcient on the dummy for Latin American
countries is also negative and statistically signiﬁcant in both the aggregate and the TFP regressions.
TFP again turns out to be the most important channel. However, the coeﬃcient estimate implies
that, on average, Latin American countries have a faster physical capital accumulation rate by
about 0.43 percentage points, which is partially oﬀset by their lower human capital accumulation
rate by about 0.26 percentage points. Finally, the coeﬃcient estimates in Table 2 suggest that
being an East Asian country has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on aggregate growth performance and human
capital accumulation during 1960–1985. However, East Asian countries suﬀer from a lower TFP
growth by about 1.46 percentage points, while experiencing a higher contribution from physical
capital accumulation by 1.11 percentage points.
4.4 Robustness to Omitted Variables
I have shown that conditional convergence in income per worker is driven almost entirely by techno-
logical catch-up with very little contribution from factor accumulation. In fact, factor accumulation
may be leading to divergence. How robust are these results to the inclusion of omitted variables?28
argument were right, then we should expect an inverted U-shaped (concave) relationship between the contribution
from physical capital accumulation and democracy. However, I ﬁnd exactly the opposite pattern. However, as I
argued earlier, missing values appear to be inﬂuential.
28Clearly, the question of robustness can also be asked in relation to alternative growth accounting methodologies.
This issue is taken up later.
174.4.1 Entering the “Most Robust Variables” One at a Time
The ﬁrst robustness check takes the “most robust variables” from Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1997), and
enters them one at a time into the baseline regressions.29 The “most robust variables” are the
variables that are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level in Table 1 of Sala-I-Martin (1997), except
the fractions of Protestant, Buddhist and Catholic in the country. Table 3 reports the implied
rates of convergence from this robustness check. It turns out that the TFP-convergence channel is
remarkably robust to these perturbations.
Output per worker converges at a rate that ranges between 1.84 to 1.35 percent per year.
The eﬀect is always statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Most importantly, it always
converges through TFP growth, at a rate that ranges between 2.02 to 1.26 percent per year,
which always turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. On the other hand,
the contribution to convergence from physical capital accumulation is small, volatile, and often
not statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level; the rate of convergence ranges between 0.27
(convergence) to -0.19 percent (divergence) per year. Finally, the contribution to convergence from
human capital accumulation is always divergent, though small and statistically insigniﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level; the rate of divergence ranges between 0.04 to 0.18 percent a year.
4.4.2 Entering the “Most Robust Variables” All at Once
The second robustness check includes the “most robust variables” all at once in the baseline regres-
sions. This reduces the 77-country sample to 66 because of missing values in some variables. Table
4 reports the implied rates of convergence through each channel. Remarkably, TFP growth still
emerges as the most important channel of convergence. Again evaluated at the average level of ini-
tial human capital, these coeﬃcient estimates imply that output per worker converges conditionally
29Note that the baseline regressions in Table 2 have already included quite a number of the most robust variables.
18at 1.28 percent per year, of which 1.48 percentage points work through TFP growth (convergence),
0.10 percentage points through physical capital accumulation (convergence), and -0.30 percentage
points through human capital accumulation (divergence). All of these channels are statistically
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
In summary, the fact that TFP growth drives conditional convergence is extremely robust to
the inclusion of omitted variables, whether the variables are included one at a time or all at once.
While human capital accumulation always leads to divergence, physical capital accumulation has
a more ambiguous eﬀect; it leads to convergence in some speciﬁcations, but divergence in others.
Nevertheless, their eﬀects are always small.
4.5 Robustness to Sample Choice – The Channels of Convergence in Rich and
Poor Countries
This section investigates whether convergence works through diﬀerent channels in rich and poor
countries. Some believe that richer countries converge through TFP growth, while the poorer
ones rely on factor accumulation.30 This hypothesis is tested by comparing the fraction of income
convergence achieved through each channel in rich and poor countries.
Speciﬁcally, the sample of 77 countries is ﬁrst sorted according to income per worker in 1960 and
then split into two halves. The baseline regressions are then re-run on each sub-sample. However,
since there are no East Asian and no Sub-Saharan African countries in the richer half of the sample,
the respective continent dummies have been dropped from the regressions. In addition, the rate
of convergence for each sub-sample is calculated using the initial human capital at its respective
sub-sample average: 5.27 years in the richer half and 2.29 years in the poorer half. Table 5 reports
the results.
30See, for example, Yujiro Hayami (1998).
19The results indicate that output per worker converges through TFP catch-up in both rich
and poor countries; indeed, TFP growth accounts for approximately the same fraction of income
convergence in both sub-samples: 1.25 in the poorer half, compared to 1.11 in the richer half.
However, convergence is much faster and statistically signiﬁcant only in the rich countries. For
example, the rate of convergence in income per worker is 2.01 percent in the richer sub-sample,
compared to only 0.60 percent in the poorer sub-sample. Factor accumulations, on other hand,
lead to divergence in both rich and poor countries. To summarize, while the tendency to converge
is much stronger in the richer countries, it always works through the same channel – the TFP
channel.
4.6 Robustness to Alternative Accounting Methodology
This section assesses robustness with respect to the growth accounting methodology used. Much
of the disagreement on what constitutes the appropriate accounting methodology arises because
physical and human capital are concepts not directly observable in the real world; they need to
be constructed. Since Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare’s methodology diﬀers from other works mainly
in how they construct their measure of human capital, an accounting methodology that measures
human capital diﬀerently – that of Hall and Jones (1999) – is used to test its robustness.31 With
this alternative accounting methodology, TFP growth is still the dominant channel of convergence
among the OECD countries, but it ceases to be the only channel in the larger 77-country sample;
physical capital accumulation turns out to be equally important in driving convergence among this
larger cross-section of countries.
More generally, Hall and Jones (1999) use the Cobb-Douglas approach with standard elasticities.
31There is a minor modiﬁcation. I did not deduct value added in the mining industry from GDP before decomposing
it to various components for two reasons. First, I want to focus on the change in how human capital is constructed.
Second, because Hall and Jones are interested in income levels, they have to worry about the inﬂuence of country
speciﬁc factors which remain constant over time, such as natural resource endowments. In contrast, this paper is
concerned with growth rates. Diﬀerencing in growth rate calculation should have accounted for them.
20They report that this simple approach yields similar results to Robert M. Solow (1957) and Laurits
R. Christensen, Dianne Cummings, and Dale W. Jorgensen (1981). They assume a production
function Y = Kα(AH)1−α,w h e r eY is output, K the stock of physical capital, H human capital-
augmented labor, and A labor-augmenting productivity. With this production function, diﬀerences
in growth rates of output per worker in each country can be decomposed into diﬀerences in the





Speciﬁcally, they construct the aggregate stock of human capital in country i as Hi = eφ(Ei)Li,
where Ei is the average years of schooling in country i, Li the number of workers, and φ (.)t h e
private return to education in a Mincerian wage regression, with φ(0) = 0. They assume diminishing
returns to education. In particular, they assume a rate of return of 13.4 percent for the ﬁrst four
years of education, 10.1 percent for the next four years, and 6.8 percent beyond the eighth year;
these rates come from George Psacharopoulos (1994), and are the average return in the sub-Saharan
Africa, the entire world, and the OECD countries respectively.33
4.6.1 Growth Decomposition Based on the Accounting Methodology of Hall and
Jones
The above methodology leads to growth decomposition for 95 countries, 92 of which overlap with
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare’s 98-country sample. Furthermore, it contains all the countries in the
sample of 77. Both methodologies lead to a large TFP component. The components from the two
decompositions have a pair-wise correlation coeﬃcient of 0.68 for physical capital accumulation, 0.50
32Hall and Jones (1999) are interested primarily in the levels of economic activities, not growth rates. However, it
is straightforward to calculate growth rates from levels.
33In contrast, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) assume a constant return of 9.5 percent for all educational levels.
Both Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) construct physical capital using the perpetual
inventory method.
21for human capital accumulation, and 0.75 for TFP growth. All of these coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Table 6 reports the summary statistics for the overlapping 92-country sample from the two
decompositions. The average rates of TFP growth from the two decompositions appear to be
similar. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare attribute more growth to contribution from physical capital
accumulation.34 Overall, the resulting growth decompositions seem to be quite insensitive to the
speciﬁc change in accounting methodology.
4.6.2 Channel Decomposition Based on the Accounting Methodology of Hall and
Jones
In this section, I perform channel decomposition using the components of growth based on Hall
and Jones’s methodology. Table 7 reports the OLS regressions for the OECD countries. It shall
be compared to Table 1. As before, output per worker converges conditionally at 2.58 percent
per year. Of the 2.58 percentage points, 2.17 percentage points now work through TFP growth
(convergence), 0.69 percentage points through physical capital accumulation (convergence), and
-0.27 percentage points through human capital accumulation (divergence). All these channels
are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level, except the channel through human capital
acquisition. Thus, despite the change in accounting methodology, the OECD countries still converge
through technological catch-up, not factor accumulation.
Table 8 reports the OLS regressions for the sample of 77 countries based on Hall and Jones’s
methodology. It shall be compared to Table 2. Evaluated at the average initial schooling of 3.69
years as before, the coeﬃcient estimates imply a convergence rate of 1.75 percent per year in output
34This is probably not surprising considering that Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) assign a higher weight to the
physical capital-output ratio. They use α/(1−α−β) instead of α/(1−α) although both Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) set α equal to 0.3 (compare equation (2) to equation (5)).
22per worker, conditional on the other determinants in the regression. However, of the 1.75 percentage
points, 0.96 percentage points now work through TFP growth (convergence), 1.00 percentage point
through physical capital accumulation (convergence), and -0.21 percentage points through human
capital accumulation (divergence). All channels, except the channel of human capital accumulation,
are statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. Thus, with the accounting methodology of Hall
and Jones (1999), TFP growth and physical capital accumulation turn out to be equally important
in driving convergence among the 77 countries. The contribution to convergence from human
capital acquisition remains small.
4.7 Final Nail in the Coﬃn of the Neo-Classical Growth Model
Under the conventional wisdom, the ﬁnding of a large Solow residual from growth accounting
exercises appears to be at odds with the ﬁnding of signiﬁcant conditional convergence from cross-
country regressions. On the one hand, large Solow residuals clearly indicate that variation in capital
accumulation cannot account for a signiﬁcant part of either worldwide economic growth or cross-
country income diﬀerences. On the other hand, conditional convergence was often thought to result
from diminishing returns to capital accumulation.35 Thus, the two literatures seem to contradict
each other concerning the role of capital accumulation and the Neo-Classical growth model which
highlights it; while capital accumulation cannot explain much of the variation in the levels and
growth rates of incomes, it is thought to somehow account for conditional convergence. Although
theoretical models that emphasize the role of technological diﬀusion in conditional convergence
have recently emerged (for example, Andrew B. Bernard and Charles I. Jones (1996), Robert J.
Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Susanto Basu and David N. Weil (1998)), there is no
direct evidence on the relative contributions of total factor productivity and factor accumulation
35See, for example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Robert
J. Barro, N. Gregory Mankiw, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995).
23to convergence.
This apparent inconsistency is resolved by the method of channel decomposition. Large Solow
residuals are consistent with conditional convergence because convergence turns out to work through
technological catch-up rather than aggregate capital accumulation. This ﬁnding is extremely robust
to the omitted variables. It is also robust to the alternative accounting methodology by Hall and
Jones (1999), if we restrict our attention to convergence among the OECD countries, where the
tendency to converge is the strongest. Hence, for the most part, aggregate capital accumulation
does not account for worldwide economic growth or cross-country income diﬀerences, nor does it
account for conditional convergence.36 In this sense, this ﬁnding essentially puts the ﬁnal nail in
the coﬃn of capital accumulation and the Neo-Classical growth model.37
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes an intuitive method to study the channels of economic growth. I argue
that channel decomposition is useful because it systematically distinguishes alternative models by
exploiting the diﬀerent channels of operation they postulate: whether they operate through physical
capital and human capital accumulation, or through total factor productivity growth. This method
gives a channel accounting identity which is reminiscent of the growth accounting identity ﬁrst
proposed by Robert Solow more than forty years ago. This should not be surprising, since channel
decomposition is in fact built on the growth accounting literature spawned by Solow’s original 1957
paper and on the growth regression literature prompted by the advent of large scale cross-country
data sets. Speciﬁcally, channel decomposition is applied by ﬁrst decomposing economic growth into
36However, the speed of convergence does depend on the initial level of human capital, which measures the ability
of countries to adopt frontier technology.
37The empirical evidence here seems most consistent with the theoretical model by Bernard and Jones (1996). They
advocate technology transfer as a potentially important force behind convergence in the framework of a constant
returns Solow growth model.
24various components in a growth accounting framework, and then regressing each component from
the growth accounting exercise on the determinants of growth.
With this method and the accounting methodology by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), I
show that, for the most part, contrary to conventional wisdom, convergence is not due to dimin-
ishing returns to factor accumulation as the Neoclassical growth model postulates. In fact, the
contribution from human capital accumulation tends to lead to divergence, although the eﬀect is
almost never statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the contribution to convergence from physical
capital accumulation is small and ambiguous in most cases. On the contrary, it is technological
catch-up which turns out to drive conditional convergence in income per capita. More generally,
although the rate of convergence is faster among richer countries, the channel of convergence is the
same for both the rich and poor countries, i.e., both converge through TFP catch-up, not factor
accumulation. This ﬁnding about TFP convergence is extremely robust to the inclusion of omit-
ted variables, albeit less so when the accounting methodology of Hall and Jones (1999) is used.
However, even under this alternative accounting methodology, TFP growth remains as the main
channel of convergence among the OECD countries, where convergence is the fastest. In conclu-
sion, these ﬁndings about the channels of convergence eﬀectively put the ﬁnal nail in the coﬃn of
the Neo-Classical growth model, as it cannot explain either cross-country growth or conditional
convergence.
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286 Appendix: Sources of Data
The following contains the sources of the variables. Some calculations may have been performed on
the raw data to arrive at the variables used in the regressions, e.g., taking averages or logarithms.
Except when noted speciﬁcally below, the variables for robustness checks come from Sala-i-Martin
(1997).
Initial GDP per Capita: Real GDP per capita in constant dollars in 1960 (Penn World Table 5.6).
Initial Human Capital: Average years of schooling in the total population over age 15 (Barro-Lee
Data Set).
Total Fertility Rate: Average fertility rate during 1960–84 (Barro-Lee Data Set).
Government Consumption Ratio: The ratio of real government consumption expenditure net of
spending on defense and on education to real GDP (Barro-Lee Data Set).
Rule of Law Index: The rule of law index (Sala-i-Martin (1997))
Democracy Index: Gastil index of political rights, averaged over 1972–84 (Barro-Lee Data Set).
Continent Dummies: Barro-Lee Data Set.
Terms of Trade Shock: Growth rate of export prices minus growth rate of import prices over
1960–84 (Barro-Lee Data Set).
Average Inﬂation: Average inﬂation rate over 1960–85 (Bruno and Easterly (1998)).
Life expectancy at birth: Life expectancy at age zero in 1960 (Barro-Lee Data Set).
Equipment Investment and Non-Equipment Investment: De Long and Summers (1993).
Index of Civil Liberties: Gastil index of civil liberties, averaged over 1972–84 (Barro-Lee Data Set).
Dummy for External War: Dummy for countries that participated in at least one external war over
1960–85 (Barro-Lee Data Set).
29Fraction of GDP in Mining, Type of Economic Organization, and Absolute Latitute: Hall and Jones
(1999).
30Table 1: Channels of Convergence for OECD Countries
Dependent Variable: Growth Rates of
Independent Output per Worker and its Components 1960–85
Variables: GOUTPUT GA GCAPITAL GHUMAN
Constant 6.47 6.09 5.17 -4.76
(3.79) (3.32) (4.46) (2.61)
ln (initial GDP per capita) -0.29 -0.48 -0.51 0.70
(0.43) (0.41) (0.50) (0.31)*
Initial human capital 3.01 2.59 0.09 0.34
(0.65)** (0.40)** (0.70) (0.35)
Interaction term
a -0.35 -0.29 -0.01 -0.05
(0.07)** (0.05)** (0.08) (0.04)
ln (total fertility rate) -1.33 -0.96 -0.40 0.02
(0.37)** (0.43)* (0.45) (0.27)
R
2 0.93 0.84 0.33 0.31
Adj.R
2 0.91 0.81 0.18 0.16
Rate of Convergence
b 2.58 2.39 0.57 -0.37
F statistic on convergence
c 38.14 123.71 1.77 3.90
Notes: Number of observations = 23. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. **Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the one percent level.
a Interaction term between ln (initial GDP per capita) and initial human capital.
b Positive rate implies convergence, and vice versa.
c F statistic testing the joint signiﬁcance of ln (initial GDP per capita) and the interaction term.
31Table 2: Channel Decomposition - Baseline Regression
Dependent Variable: Growth Rates of
Independent Output per Worker and its Components 1960–85
Variables: GOUTPUT GA GCAPITAL GHUMAN
Constant 12.25 12.73 0.40 -0.88
(3.07)** (4.17)** (3.11) (1.15)
ln (initial GDP per capita) -1.07 -1.78 0.58 0.13
(0.39)** (0.55)** (0.40) (0.14)
Initial human capital 1.54 0.45 0.94 0.15
(0.52)** (0.67) (0.48) (0.19)
Interaction term -0.18 -0.04 -0.13 -0.02
(0.06)** (0.08) (0.06)* (0.02)
ln (total fertility rate) -0.83 -0.56 -0.27 0.00
(0.53) (0.66) (0.40) (0.16)
Government consumption ratio -10.19 -7.62 -1.29 -1.30
(2.87)** (3.05)* (2.35) (1.28)
Rule of law index 1.89 2.31 -0.45 0.03
(0.66)** (0.70)** (0.40) (0.20)
Democracy index 0.02 1.39 -1.67 0.30
(0.38) (0.56)* (0.41)** (0.16)
Democracy index squared -0.02 -0.16 0.18 -0.03
(0.04) (0.06)** (0.04)** (0.02)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -2.02 -1.90 -0.14 0.03
(0.46)** (0.60)** (0.40) (0.15)
Dummy for Latin America -1.46 -1.62 0.43 -0.26
(0.33)** (0.40)** (0.26) (0.09)**
Dummy for East Asia -0.42 -1.46 1.11 -0.07
(0.48) (0.45)** (0.37)** (0.20)
R
2 0.70 0.61 0.43 0.26
Adj.R
2 0.65 0.54 0.34 0.13
Rate of Convergence 1.75 1.92 -0.11 -0.06
F statistic on convergence
a 22.37 13.74 2.44 0.52
F Statistic on democracy
index and its square
b 0.95 4.14 8.46 1.81
F Statistic on exclusion
c 2.17 0.81 1.49 0.40
Notes: Number of observations = 77. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. *Signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. **Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the one percent level.
a F
statistic testing the joint signiﬁcance of ln (initial GDP per capita) and the interaction term.
b F statistic testing
the joint signiﬁcance of the democracy index and its square.
c F statistic testing the joint signiﬁcance of the terms
of trade shock, initial life expectancy at birth, and average inﬂation.
32Table 3: Robustness of Technological Convergence - Including One at a Time
Additional Rates of Convergence
Variable N GOUTPUT GA GCAPITAL GHUMAN
Baseline 77 1.74 1.92 -0.11 -0.06
Regression (22.37)*** (13.74)*** (2.44)* (0.52)
Equipment 68 1.38 1.30 0.25 -0.17
Investment (24.81)*** (11.94)*** (1.23) (3.07)*
Sachs-Warner 77 1.67 1.84 -0.06 -0.09
Openness Index (19.34)*** (12.71)*** (2.91)* (0.60)
Fraction of 77 1.70 1.91 -0.10 -0.10
Confucius (20.10)*** (12.86)*** (2.44)* (0.55)
Fraction of 77 1.77 2.01 -0.15 -0.08
Muslim (22.08)*** (14.29)*** (2.18) (0.53)
Index of Civil 77 1.75 1.94 -0.12 -0.05
Liberties (28.52)*** (19.08)*** (1.44) (0.83)
Revolutions and 77 1.74 1.92 -0.11 -0.05
Coups per year (22.41)*** (13.22)*** (2.39) (0.47)
Fraction of GDP 77 1.67 1.70 0.04 -0.07
in Mining (19.98)*** (10.32)*** (2.26) (0.89)
Sd of Black 75 1.69 1.82 0.03 -0.15
Mkt Premium (23.58)*** (11.21)*** (6.34)*** (1.59)
Primary 76 1.74 1.92 -0.11 -0.05
Exports (18.51)*** (12.86)*** (1.76) (0.65)
Type of Econ. 77 1.73 1.90 -0.10 -0.06
Organization (29.97)*** (19.98)*** (2.19) (0.48)
Dummy for 77 1.83 2.02 -0.13 -0.05
External War (26.93)*** (17.55)*** (2.42)* (0.42)
Non-Equipment 68 1.34 1.25 0.27 -0.18
Investment (17.63)*** (7.91)*** (1.51) (2.96)*
Absolute 77 1.75 1.98 -0.18 -0.03
Latitude (23.43)*** (15.46)*** (2.93)* (0.40)
Real Exchange 77 1.74 1.92 -0.11 -0.06
Rate Distortion (22.12)*** (13.68)*** (2.31) (0.54)
Notes: F statistics testing the hypothesis of zero rate of convergence are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the ten percent level. **Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. ***Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the one percent level.
33Table 4: Robustness of Technological Convergence - Including All at Once
Dependent Variable: Growth Rates of
Independent Output per Worker and its Components 1960–85
Variables: GOUTPUT GA GCAPITAL GHUMAN
ln (initial GDP per capita) -0.07 -0.83 0.43 0.33
(0.45) (0.50) (0.32) (0.16)*
Interaction term -0.33 -0.17 -0.14 -0.01
(0.07)** (0.08)* (0.05)* (0.03)
R
2 0.86 0.78 0.62 0.60
Adj.R
2 0.78 0.64 0.38 0.35
Rate of Convergence 1.28 1.48 0.10 -0.30
F statistic on conditional 18.06 8.52 3.51 4.07
convergence/divergence
a
Notes: Number of observations = 66. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. *Signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. **Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the one percent level.
a F statistic testing the joint signiﬁcance of ln (initial GDP per capita) and the interaction term.
34Table 5: The Channels of Convergence for Rich and Poor Countries
Dependent Variable: Growth Rates of
Independent Output per Worker and its Components 1960–85
Variables: GOUTPUT GA GCAPITAL GHUMAN
A. Convergence for the Richer Half of the 77 Sample (N = 38)
ln (initial GDP per capita) -0.28 -1.50 0.99 0.23
(0.68) (0.94) (0.47) (0.16)
Interaction term -0.33 -0.14 -0.17 -0.02
(0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.03)
Rate of Convergence
a 2.01 2.23 -0.10 -0.12
Fraction of Aggregate
Convergence 1.00 1.11 -0.05 -0.06
F statistic on convergence
b 24.84*** 25.79*** 2.45 1.08
B. Convergence for the Poorer Half of the 77 Sample (N = 39)
ln (initial GDP per capita) -0.11 -0.53 0.26 0.16
(1.05) (0.80) (0.78) (0.37)
Interaction term -0.22 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06
(0.37) (0.32) (0.27) (0.16)
Rate of Convergence
c 0.60 0.75 -0.11 -0.03
Fraction of Aggregate
Convergence 1.00 1.25 -0.18 -0.05
F statistic on convergence
b 0.64 0.82 0.06 0.09
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses.
a The rates of convergence are evaluated at the average initial human capital in this sub-sample, which is 5.27 years.
There are no East Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries in this sub-sample and hence the respective continent
dummies have been dropped from the regressions.
b F statistic testing the joint signiﬁcance of ln (initial GDP per capita) and the interaction term. *Signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the ten percent level. **Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. ***Signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the one percent level.
c The rates of convergence are evaluated at the average initial human capital in this sub-sample, which is 2.29 years.
All three continent dummies are included in the regressions.
35Table 6: Comparison of Summary Statistics from Alternative Decompositions
Growth rates of output per worker Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
and its components over 1960-1985
Growth rate of output per worker 2.23 1.59 -1.8 6.85
Contribution from physical capital 0.79 0.90 -1.63 4.07
0.59 1.40 -3.02 6.46
Contribution from human capital 0.46 0.34 -0.43 1.57
0.77 0.42 -0.38 1.73
TFP growth 0.98 1.59 -3.26 4.81
0.86 1.61 -3.90 4.26
Note: The number of observation = 92. The ﬁrst number refers to the observations from Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare’s decomposition while the second one refers to the observations based on Hall and Jones’ decomposition.
36Table 7: Channels of Convergence for OECD Countries Based on Hall and Jones’s Growth Decom-
position
Dependent Variable: Growth Rates of
Independent Output per Worker and its Components 1960–85
Variables: GOUTPUT GA GCAPITAL GHUMAN
Constant 6.47 7.74 -0.34 -0.94
(3.79) (5.17) (2.78) (2.10)
ln (initial GDP per capita) -0.29 -0.51 -0.08 0.30
(0.43) (0.61) (0.32) (0.26)
Initial human capital 3.01 2.27 0.85 -0.11
(0.65)** (0.78)** (0.56) (0.28)
Interaction term -0.35 -0.25 -0.09 -0.01
(0.07)** (0.09)* (0.06) (0.03)
ln (total fertility rate) -1.33 -2.34 0.99 0.02
(0.37)** (0.68)** (0.37)* (0.26)
R
2 0.93 0.75 0.55 0.65
Rate of Convergence 2.58 2.17 0.69 -0.27
F statistic on convergence
a 37.91 29.14 2.73 1.38
Notes: Number of observations = 23. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. **Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the one percent level.
a F statistic testing the joint signiﬁcance of ln (initial GDP per capita) and the interaction term.
37Table 8: Channel Decomposition Based on Hall et al.’s Decomposition Baseline Regression
Dependent Variable: Growth Rates of
Independent Output per Worker and its Components 1960–85
Variables: GOUTPUT GA GCAPITAL GHUMAN
Constant 12.25 1.03 10.66 0.54
(3.07)** (4.65) (3.61)** (1.32)
ln (initial GDP per capita) -1.07 -0.59 -0.70 0.22
(0.39)** (0.61) (0.44) (0.13)
Initial human capital 1.54 1.02 0.64 -0.13
(0.52)** (0.86) (0.62) (0.22)
Interaction term -0.18 -0.10 -0.08 -0.00
(0.06)** (0.10) (0.07) (0.03)
ln (total fertility rate) -0.83 -0.46 -0.24 -0.12
(0.53) (0.78) (0.47) (0.18)
Government consumption ratio -10.19 -2.68 -5.61 -1.91
(2.87)** (3.01) (2.23)* (0.96)
Rule of law index 1.89 1.43 0.63 -0.17
(0.66)** (0.77) (0.58) (0.21)
Democracy index 0.02 2.34 -2.18 -0.14
(0.38) (0.55)** (0.37)** (0.14)
Democracy index squared -0.02 -0.26 0.23 0.01
(0.04) (0.06)** (0.04)** (0.02)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -2.02 0.06 -1.79 -0.29
(0.46)** (0.72) (0.57)** (0.17)
Dummy for Latin America -1.46 -1.49 0.19 -0.15
(0.33)** (0.46)** (0.31) (0.09)
Dummy for East Asia -0.42 -2.04 1.33 0.28
(0.48) (0.56)** (0.46)** (0.19)
R
2 0.70 0.49 0.56 0.54
Rate of Convergence 1.75 0.96 1.00 -0.21
F statistic on convergence
a 22.43 2.87 5.73 1.90
F Statistic on democracy
index and its square
b 0.96 9.31 17.04 1.37
Notes: Number of observations = 77. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in the parentheses. *Signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. **Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the one percent level.
a F statistic testing the joint signiﬁcance of ln (initial GDP per capita) and the interaction term.
b F statistic testing the joint signiﬁcance of the democracy index and its square.
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